MOHAMMED AL-SALAFI

Written in December 9th 2017 for Project New Yemen, a series of writings to explain what is going on in Yemen and explore development paths

Before the conflict, Yemen had faced severe adversities: Poverty, unemployment and economic decline on the economic front, and power struggle, local grievances and terrorism on the political front. Needless to mention the power shake-up after the spring revolution in 2011, Yemen’s problems today have dramatically exacerbated on all fronts, culminating into what is seen to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the social setting as composed of fragmented social identities have set the stage for a naturally complex problem – one that is being artifically deepened and man-made exploited.

Even worse, the Houthi rebellion in 2014 and the Saudi-led coalition were an added salt poured on a wound. Given the complexity of the war in Yemen, it is therefore not surprising that all peace efforts ended in futility. Neither a suitable environment for economic and relief programs was created, nor the restoration of a nation-wide state legitimacy became viable. The silver lining remains captive within only “efforts and condemnations” expressed by the international community to resolve the conflict, far from good inclusive implementation or even a good understanding of the problems.

The Problem

It must be clear by now that the war in Yemen is not the sole problem, but the consequence of a series of problems. Thus, the word problem here stands for the deeply rooted factors that hinders the war from ending. Of crucial concern are economic decline, political brinkmanship, social fragmentation and poor governance.

To tackle the problem, this analysis overhauls the regular discourse around conflict resolution and state building by examining possible scenarios and accordingly crafting out a strategy. Primarily, the analysis highlights parameters of the war, while creating room for policy analysis in shaping the way forward in Yemen.

But before we get to that, here’s an explanation on what is happening in Yemen and why it remains deadlocked.

Paradoxically, Yemen faces what seems to be a trilemma. A trilemma of peace, economic opportunity and a monopoly of power, of which you can only achieve either two of the three objectives.

Let’s define the objectives first:

1. It is important to note that peace, does not necessarily mean the absence of violence nor does the absence of violence mean the prevalence of peace. Countries can break-out of conflict, yet remain politically divided among different polities – think Somaliland, Cyprus and Colombia. Hence, in an ideal scenario, peace stands for a deal where the Houthi rebels release all detainees and withdraw from all state institutions in practice – focally from Sana’a. Equally having the Saudi-led coalition halt their bombing campaign.

However, in this context, given the current fragmented setting of the power structure, a peace deal means a political settlement to end armed violence and maintaining a ceasefire, at the same time succumbing to de-facto power. Principally, a decentralization of power to independent entities.  Doing so means that the Houthi rebels will take charge of the northern regions while the Southern Transitional Council (STC) controls the South, and the rest divided between autonomous tribal affiliates and state control. A more disintegrated approach that is plausible based on realities on ground.

2. By contrast, a monopoly of power stands for top-down strategies in prioritizing military objectives, where the final objective is the submission of independent military units, militias, tribal affiliations and other fighting groups to state central forces. Practically, this would mean the restoration of a nation-wide state legitimacy, with the Yemeni army being the sole security force liberating all major cities from the militia control and returning to rule from Sana’a – the capital city. This scenario currently seems impractical especially after the assassination of former president Ali Saleh.

3. Finally, economic opportunity does not translate to industrialization and prosperity in this context, rather, an economy of resilience, where employment benefits and basic services are rendered accessible – enough to avert youth from taking up arms to fight and allow for relief corridors.

The Trilemma

Striking a peace deal to maintain ceasefire, while restoring state legitimacy parallel to revitalizing the economy is the ideal scenario. However, attaining all three at the same time remains farfetched, hence, a trilemma. What remains plausible is achieving at least two out of the three scenarios:

A. Monopoly of power and peace and no economic opportunity;

B. Peace and economic opportunity and no monopoly of power;

C. Monopoly of power and economic opportunity and no peace.

In scenario A (also the current approach being pursued since the beginning of the war), a top-down approach comes into play: First focusing on restoring state legitimacy by prioritizing military objectives and negotiating a peace deal, then everything else follows. The irony is that this approach is justified as hinged on the withdrawal of the Houthi rebels from Sana’a. The approach is moreover legitimized and supported by the international community as navigated by the UN resolution 2216, the GCC initiative and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes.

Colombia provides evidence of how traditional state-building can produce rather negative outcomes when targeted unidimensional; as in solely focusing on the restoration of state legitimacy through military objectives. This results in greater casualties and weakened local institutions because of the incentives provided to military generals.

However, the bigger issue in focusing all efforts on these two options to maneuver a military and political solution, have in return ignored the state of the economy. Power mongering politicians continue to buy time arguing about state legitimacy and national identity, neglecting the rising rates of poverty. And as fighting continues in the absence of economic opportunity, a rising trend of civilians taking up arms is likely to persist.

Scenario B presents both a peace deal and an economic opportunity while giving up on state legitimacy and the monopoly of power. Is this more plausible? Yes, indeed. Hadramawt, Mareb, and Sana’a provide evidence where local business environment was seen spurred while relatively maintaining a stable and safe region. The reason being, that local governance aligns better with local demand especially when the central government is weak. Moreover, such a setting helps contain social fragmentation, where identity is prone to match authority leading to positive compliance.

However, this weakens the overall central government. A ceasefire resulting from a political agreement will give rise to small autonomous states governed solely by local de facto leaders. This will not sit well with those living in Sana’a, for example, as majority refuse to live under the Houthi militia control. It is also geopolitically critical where Iran-backed militias create an eventual threat lingering along the Saudi border.

Finally, scenario C ignores the peace factor, opting only for a monopoly of power and economic opportunity. A multi-dimensional approach which prioritizes the military objective of fighting the Houthis, at the same time enhancing economic activities in liberated areas.

It is a very ambitious scenario. Here, good governance is a prerequisite, and a sense of a unified national patriotism is required. This scenario could nevertheless result in more casualties and infrastructural destruction in regions not yet liberated.

For good governance to precede, technocrats and characters with integrity are needed. And for a unified sense of nationhood to exert, a shared struggle is a good starting point. For the first, Yemen is equipped with potential competent leaders. As for the latter, many would argue that the murder of former president Saleh is a quantified event that could harmonize the masses – or at least, is perceived that way.

Re-engineering the way forward

To understand which approach will prove effective, we must think managerially. Wars and conflicts are not only about state legitimacy, but most importantly, about the people (the customers). And thus, about managing the strategy to pursue and how it benefits the people, State and warring parties. The analogy is reflected where firms only survive when their customers are satisfied, not when the board of directors are. Managers thus find interest in looking after their people, and so should policymakers think.

The bottom line question then becomes, what do the Yemeni people want?

Earlier this summer, the Yemen Polling Center released the results of the largest ever nation-wide survey conducted on living conditions and security-related issues in Yemen. The results drawn represent the public’s perception of the living conditions they face. The results account for questions aimed at understanding the impact of the war on the Yemeni people and their conditions.

Among the questions asked was, “What is your greatest concern?”, a straight question which stood out boldly. More often, it is common to think that during conflicts, insecurity becomes the greatest issue. Keeping that in mind, policymakers tend to prioritize a monopoly of violence to pursue state legitimacy in a top-down approach. However, the results of this survey presented a different perspective: 58% of the respondents answered poverty and living conditions as their greatest concern, whereas only 4% identified insecurity as their greatest concern and 14% as the general situation of the country. Despite being infamously labeled as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis outpacing Haiti as the worst cholera outbreak in history, the fear of epidemics accounted for only 2% of the respondents.

The results show that the Yemeni people are less concerned about state legitimacy or peacemaking. They tend to worry about incomes, basic services, and jobs. In return, achieving these objectives is likely to create a suitable environment for peace efforts, as more youth are likely to be deterred from fighting.

That being said, scenario A becomes less viable, unless decisive mediation by third parties spring into action. The war in Yemen today is different compared to its starting point. Several power structures and critical events have shaped it differently, which puts past peace deals and state-building initiatives into question – sometimes irrelevant.

A new and more critical approach to the conflict is necessary. The international community must reach an agreement for a ceasefire – genuine peace and handshaking can come later. With a ceasefire, economic initiatives can take place with increased influx of relief aid into the country.  The goal would then be the emergence of economic opportunities and the reduction of violence trends in a virtuous circle.

Until the government questions its own integrity, scenario B becomes both practical and pragmatic considering the current realities. Not only to enhance relief programs and create economic opportunities but to also increase peace prospects and clamp down on war casualties.